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Shinkyoo Han, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
 
 
The first essay, “Producers and Predators in a Multiple Community Setting” investigates how 
different ways of organizing the provision of local policing services in a multi-community 
setting affect the level of criminal activity, the spatial distribution of the population, the cost of 
policing, and overall productivity across all communities. Our analysis shows that if individual 
local governments are boundedly rational, in the sense that they do not anticipate the effects of 
their own defense activity on the equilibrium predator/producer ratio and distribution of producer 
activity, then competition among local governments never achieves a first-best outcome and 
sometimes yields a lower consumption per capita in equilibrium than would be achieved if there 
were no local governments and each agent who chose to be a producer also chose his own level 
of defense. The second essay, “Discriminatory Taxation in a Model of Local Community 
Competition,” analyzes tax competition for new economic resources among local communities 
within the context of a dynamic, overlapping generations model. We show that in a simple model 
of discriminatory tax competition, allowing communities to compete for new entrants via the use 
of entry bonuses and entry taxes does not produce a ‘race to the bottom,’ does not reduce overall 
efficiency, and can prevent the economy from getting stuck in an inefficient allocation of 
resources across communities. The third essay, “A Note on the Effects of Tax Increment 
Financing on the Path of Land Development,” shows that TIFs introduce distortions in the early 
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use of property even as they reduce tax distortions on later use of property. The net effect of a 
TIF on the dynamic efficiency of land use depends on the magnitude of the TIF subsidy. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The essays that comprise the thesis deal with different aspects of local public finance. Two of the 
essays apply general equilibrium analysis to the competition among local communities. The third 
essay studies the nature of a second best policy for taxation of land within a dynamic framework. 
The first essay, “Producers and Predators in a Multiple Community Setting,” (published in the 
Berkeley Electronic Journals in Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy 2004) analyzes an 
extension of a model of production and predation due to Grossman (1998) to a multiple 
community setting. In a multiple community setting, defense expenditures in any one community 
have the property of a local public good. Such expenditures produce effects on other 
communities. These effects include changes in the distribution of population among 
communities, the redistribution of predatory efforts over communities, and an induced change in 
the predator/producer ratio in the economy as a whole. The question we address is whether the 
level of defense chosen by local governments so as to maximize the per capita consumption of 
their own producers, given defense levels elsewhere, always produces a second-best outcome. 
Our analysis shows that if the number of communities is fixed, fully rational local government 
decision-making leads to the same level of defense activity and equilibrium per capita 
consumption as would be chosen by a central planner. However, if individual local governments 
are boundedly rational, in the sense that they do not anticipate the effects of their own defense 
activity on the equilibrium predator/producer ratio and distribution of producer activity, then 
competition among local governments never achieves a first-best outcome. Furthermore, the 
equilibrium associated with competition among boundedly rational local governments can 
sometimes yield a lower consumption per capita in equilibrium than would be achieved if there 
were no local governments and each agent who chose to be a producer also chose his/her own 
level of defense.  
The second essay, “Discriminatory Taxation in a Model of Local Community 
Competition,” analyzes tax competition for new economic resources among independent local 
communities within the context of a dynamic, overlapping generations model. Agents live for 
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two periods. In the first period, they are mobile and must choose a community in which to reside 
and to locate their resources. In the second period, an agent is a member of a community chosen 
in the first period of life and the agent’s resources must be used within that particular 
community. In this model, each community must finance a local public good. A community 
chooses a fiscal policy each period to maximize the after-tax per capita income of its existing, 
old residents, taking as given the tax policy of other communities. Existing residents benefit from 
attracting new residents and their resources whose output can be taxed to help finance the local 
public good. This benefit is limited by the fact that as the size of the community grows output 
per capita tends to diminish. Potential entrants are forward looking. They recognize that the 
discounted present value of expected lifetime after-tax income of entry into a community 
depends upon the present size of its existing population, its tax policy when they first enter that 
community, and its expected size and related tax policy of their chosen community in the second 
period of their lives, when they and their resources have become immobile. In the steady state all 
communities are of the same size and adopt the same tax policy. The equilibrium tax policy 
provides an ‘entry bonus’ to newcomers. The equilibrium bonus is determined by the parameters 
of the production function and the magnitude of the fixed cost associated with the local public 
good. The bonus is finite, so that there is not a “race to the bottom.” Furthermore, the bonus 
entails no welfare loss. 
The third essay, “A Note on the Effects of Tax Increment Financing on the Path of Land 
Development” shows that TIF reduces the distortionary effect of property taxes on TIF 
qualifying investments, but increases the distortionary effect of property taxation on earlier, non-
qualifying, investments. The net effect of a TIF on the dynamic efficiency of land use depends 
on the magnitude of the TIF subsidy. 
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2.0  PRODUCERS AND PREDATORS IN A MULTIPLE COMMUNITY SETTING1 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Many good arguments support the establishment of private property rights. But private property 
rights have to be protected. This is true, regardless of whether or not there exists any formal 
government to enforce these rights. Protection of property is costly. Furthermore, when an 
individual decides to protect his/her own property from exploitation by others, this has effects on 
the security of other property owners. Costly protection of the property of some may not only 
force others to incur similar protection costs, it can also serve as a deterrent that will reduce the 
volume of predatory activity in general. 
Grossman (1998) presents a general equilibrium model that captures these externalities.2 
In this model individuals choose to be either producers or predators. An individual’s decision to 
be a predator or producer depends upon his productivity in either role. Producers expend 
resources to defend what they produce. The more resources that producers as a group devote to 
defense the less consumable output they produce, but the greater the share of that output they 
successfully keep from predators. In equilibrium predators and producers have the same 
expected consumption per capita. Therefore, the equilibrium ratio of predators to producers is 
related to the equilibrium average defense level among producers.3 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter has been published in the BEPress. Han, Shinkyoo and Ochs, Jack (2004) “Producers and 
Predators in a Multiple Community Setting,” Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1, Article 11. 
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol4/iss1/art11 
2 Grossman’s model is itself a variant of a model first presented by Grossman and Kim (1995). 
3 The assumption that an individual chooses whether to become a producer or a predator based upon that 
individual’s expected utility in one ‘occupation’ relative to the other is central to the ‘economic approach’ to the 
analysis of crime that stems from the seminal paper by Gary Becker (1968). There has been a voluminous empirical 
literature based on a partial equilibrium model of the demand and supply of criminal activity that has been devoted 
to measuring the magnitude of the response of criminal activity to factors that may affect the returns to criminal 
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Grossman considers two alternative institutions for organizing defense. In one institution, 
which we call atomistic competition, each individual producer chooses his own level of defense. 
In the second institution, which we call global government, a common level of defense is chosen 
by a single decision-maker whose decision is binding on all producers. In atomistic competition, 
any one producer cannot affect the probability of being attacked. That probability is determined 
by the average defense level among the community of producers. Nevertheless, individual 
producers do have an incentive to invest in defense because individual defense efforts affect the 
likelihood that a producer will be able to successfully fend off an attack if he is attacked. Of 
course, the average level of defense in a community of producers does depend upon the level of 
defense of each producer. Therefore, under atomistic competition, each individual producer’s 
defense decision does generate an externality. Not surprisingly, Grossman can show that if a 
single decision-maker can choose the common level of defense, binding on all producers, then 
the level of defense that maximizes consumption per capita is greater than the equilibrium level 
of defense that emerges under atomistic competition. Indeed, in his model, the common level of 
defense that maximizes per capita consumption is one at which the return from being a producer 
exceeds the return from predatory activity, even after the tax necessary to support the common 
defense. 
Individual defense and global defense of property represent polar extreme forms of 
organization. It is often the case that responsibility of protection of property in a given region is 
assigned to a local government for that region.4 A local government may be concerned with the 
per capita consumption of its own citizens, but not with that of people in other regions. Unlike an 
individual citizen’s protection activities, a local government’s decision with respect to the 
average level of protection to have in its region will have an effect on the probability that a 
predatory attack strike its own citizens. Changing the average level of defense in one region will 
not only have a deterrence effect locally, but will also shift the locus of predatory activity 
elsewhere. In what follows, we modify the Grossman model in a way that allows for this type of 
competition among locales. 
                                                                                                                                                             
activity relative to legal activity. For a discussion of that literature and references to other surveys, see Ehrlich 
(1996). 
4 A group of property owners in a condominium association may, for our purposes, be considered a local 
government. 
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This modification requires us to introduce a raison d’etre of multiple communities, which 
we do via a productivity index. The productivity index relates the productivity of a producer in a 
given community to the size of that community. This introduces another channel through which 
decisions in any one community affect producers in other communities. 
 This extension of the model allows us to compare three different forms of organization of 
defense: atomistic competition in which producers make their own decisions with regard to 
defense; local government competition in which each local government chooses a common level 
of defense for all producers within its jurisdictions; central planning in which a single authority 
chooses the level of defense for all producers regardless of jurisdiction. In what follows, we 
compare the symmetric Nash equilibria associated with atomistic competition and competition 
among local governments. We find that when the number of communities is fixed, competition 
among fully rational local governments (i.e., governments that fully anticipate how agents will 
adapt to any policy they adopt) leads to the equilibrium level of defense and consumption per 
capita that is identical to the common level of defense and consumption per capita that would be 
chosen by a central planner. However, if local governments are boundedly rational, in the sense 
that they do not fully anticipate how agents will respond to any policy change they adopt, then 
the equilibrium level of consumption per capita is never as high as that achieved by central 
planning and, under certain conditions, may be even lower than the equilibrium level of 
consumption per capita associated with the equilibrium of atomistic competition.. 
2.1.1 Related literature 
In the Grossman model, an agent’s resources are inalienable. Each agent must decide whether to 
use those resources in a productive or an appropriative activity. It is the producer’s output that 
must be defended from appropriation. Skaperdas (1992) considers another model in which each 
agent has inalienable resources that can be used in productive or appropriative activities. 
Skaperdas analyzes a two-player game in which each agent decides how much of an inalienable 
resource to make available as an input into a production process whose output depends upon the 
inputs of both agents. The remainder of each agent’s resource is devoted to an appropriative 
activity. The appropriative efforts of both players are inputs into a conflict function that 
determines the respective probabilities of each agent claiming the output of the production 
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process. This setup is not well suited to exploring how different institutions for organizing 
defensive efforts affect the equilibrium level of output. 
Skogh and Stuart (1982) consider how the introduction of a social system of discovery 
and punishment of predators would affect the equilibrium allocation of effort over production, 
protection, and predation. Like Grossman, we abstract from any collective effort at the discovery 
and punishment of predators. 
A productive resource may itself be alienable. Hirshleifer (1995) considers a model in 
which there is a productive resource whose ownership is not well-defined. All agents must fight 
to control this resource. Therefore, in his model there is no distinction made between predatory 
and protection activities. Meza and Gould (1992) provide a model of enclosures, where 
ownership of land is well-defined but the owner must decide whether or not to incur an 
‘enclosure cost’ and deny free access to his/her property. Such enclosures by one landowner can 
force other landowners also to incur these costs in order to prevent a spillover of individuals who 
seek free access to unenclosed land. As they demonstrate, this can lead to an equilibrium in 
which all property is enclosed even though the enclosure costs make this less efficient than a 
system in which no property is enclosed. In this model, workers choose to work for wages or to 
work on unenclosed land. There is no predatory activity, as such. 
2.2 BASIC STRUCTURE 
The basic structure of the environment within which all three forms of organization operate is as 
follows. The total population is of unit mass. Each agent has one unit of an inalienable resource. 
Each agent chooses to be either a producer or a predator. An agent who chooses to be a predator 
devotes all of this resource to predation. The number of locations at which production can take 
place is n. An agent who chooses to be a producer is located in one of these n locations. We are 
interested only in symmetric equilibria. Therefore, we assume an equal number of producers in 
every location. A producer j in location i chooses a fraction, dij, of his resource to devote to 
defense. The remainder is devoted to production. 
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The productivity of a producer’s production activity in community i depends upon a 
productivity index, yi, where yi depends on a technology parameter, k, and on the fraction, πi, of 
all producers who reside in community i. The form of the index function is yi(πi,k) = πi(2k−πi). 
Thus, positive agglomeration effects of community size over some range are more than offset by 
the negative congestion effects of community size over another range. The output of producer j 
living in community i is then (1−dij)yi. 
Predators are free to roam over all locations. The fraction of total predatory effort that is 
directed against community i, Gi(d) ≥ 0, is a function of the vector of average defense level 
across communities d = (di, d−i) such that 11 =∑ =ni iG . The fraction of all agents who are predators 
is γ. Therefore, the expected number of predators attacking community i is {γ Gi(d)}. Predators 
are aware of the average level of defense in any community, but do not know the level of defense 
chosen by any particular producer. Therefore, having chosen a community to attack, a predator 
strikes one producer, chosen at random from the producers in that community. Consequently, the 
probability of producer j in community i being attacked is ℘ij(d, πi) ={γ Gi(d)/πi}. Given any 
positive probability of being attacked, the probability that a predator’s attack on a producer will 
be successful in transferring what that producer has produced to the predator depends upon that 
producer’s level of protection dij. This probability is determined by the ratio dij/t, where t is a 
predation efficiency parameter. 
A successful attack transfers the output of the producer who is attacked to the predator. 
Therefore, the expected consumption, Cij, of producer j in community i depends upon his own 
defense effort dij, the average defense effort in his community di, the average defense level in 
other communities d−i, and the productivity index in his community yi: 
 
( ) iijiijijiijij ydtdC )1(),(1),( −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −℘+℘= ππ dd .   (1) 
 
For future reference, the notation is summed up as follows: 
 
γ fraction of population who are predators 
(1−γ) fraction of population who are producers 
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p ratio of predators to producers 
πi number of producers in community i 
yi πi(2k−πi) = productivity index of community i 
dij defense effort of producer j in community i 
di average defense level in community i 
d−i average defense level in the communities except i 
Gi fraction of predatory effort of a predator directed against community i 
℘ij probability of producer j in community i being attacked 
n number of local communities 
t predation efficiency parameter (0 < t < 1) 
k production technology parameter (0 < k < 1) 
Cij expected consumption of producer j in community i 
Di expected consumption of a predator in community i 
2.3 ATOMISTIC EQUILIBRIUM 
Atomistic competition involves no collective decision-making with regard to protection activity. 
In this individual non-cooperative competition, a producer’s protection activity affects his 
expected consumption through two channels. First, the level of defense chosen by each producer, 
when aggregated, determines the average defense in his community. Since each individual is of 
measure zero, however, the defense level chosen by a producer has an imperceptible effect on 
the average level of defense. Accordingly, this indirect impact of any individual’s choice on the 
probability of being attacked is infinitesimal.5 Second, the protection activity of a producer 
directly affects the probability that a predator’s attack on the producer will be successful in 
transferring what that producer has produced to the predator, conditional on being attacked. This 
                                                 
5 Note that, like Grossman (1998), we assume that the probability of a producer being attacked depends only on the 
average level of defense in his community, and is independent of his own defense level. If individual producers were 
allowed to influence the probability of being attacked, given a continuum of producers, the equilibrium level of 
protection activities would absorb all the resources and there would be no production for a given predator/producer 
ratio. 
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provides a motivation for an individual producer to invest in protection of his own property, 
given any positive probability of being attacked. 
We are interested in the symmetric equilibrium in which identical agents employ the 
same strategy. Imposing the symmetric equilibrium condition, we simply drop the subscripts in 
the expected consumption for producer j since, in equilibrium, this is the same for any producer 
in any community. Also, notice that symmetry implies that in equilibrium the fraction of total 
predatory effort must be the same across communities, i.e. Gi = G−i = 1/n. Symmetry further 
means that in equilibrium every community has the same number of producers, π = (1−γ)/n. 
Therefore, since predators strike at random in a community, the probability of a producer in 
community i being attacked, denoted as ℘, is {γ (1/n)(1/π)}. Since π = (1−γ)/n and p = γ /(1−γ), 
℘ = p. Then the expected consumption of producer j is 
 
( ) ydp
t
dpC j )1(1 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+= .     (2) 
 
Producers must determine the fraction of resources to devote to defense to maximize their 
expected consumption. Since each producer is of measure zero, in making this choice any 
producer must take the predator/producer ratio, p, as given. Imposing the equilibrium condition 
that each producer has the same defense level, we derive the equilibrium level of defense, d(p;t), 
by solving the first-order condition to the producer maximization problem, 
 
d
Max  ( ) ydp
t
dpC j )1(1 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=  s. t. ,  0≥p 10 <≤≤ td . 6 
 
The first-order conditions for the solution to this problem imply the equilibrium 
relationship between the defense level, d, the equilibrium predator/producer ratio, p, and the 
effectiveness of predation parameter, t. 
 
                                                 
6 For p ≥ 0, the expected consumption per predator must be nonnegative. This requires d ≤ t, where t is a measure of 
effectiveness of predation. 
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p
pttptpd
2
);( +−= .    (3) 
 
The optimal level of defense given p is decreasing in the predation efficiency parameter, 
t, because an increase in t reduces the marginal benefit of defense to a producer who faces any 
given probability of being attacked. For any given average level of defense in the community, an 
increase in the predator/producer ratio, p, increases the probability of any producer being 
attacked. This increases the marginal benefit of defense expenditure to an individual producer 
and accounts for a positive relationship between d(p;t) and p. Because an individual cannot affect 
the average level of defense in his own community or the global predator/producer ratio, p, no 
individual has an incentive to react as the number of communities, n, changes, if such a change 
does not affect p. 
To find equilibrium values of both d and p in terms of the parameters of the model, we 
exploit a second equilibrium condition: in equilibrium an individual must be indifferent between 
being a producer and a predator. This implies that in equilibrium the expected consumption of an 
agent is the same regardless of his chosen role. As described above, the equilibrium probability 
of any particular producer being attacked is p, and conditional on that producer being attacked 
the expected consumption of the predator who makes that attack is (1−d/t)(1−d)y. Since (1−γ) 
individuals are producers, the expected consumption of all predators is {p(1−d/t)(1−d)y}(1−γ). 
Di denotes the expected consumption of a predator in community i, which in equilibrium 
is the same regardless of the community he attacks. Let this common equilibrium level of 
expected consumption per predator be D. Therefore, with γ predators, the expected consumption 
per predator is 
 
yd
t
dyd
t
dpD )1(11)1(1 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= γ
γ ,   (4) 
 
where the second equality is due to the predator/producer ratio p = γ /(1−γ). Similarly, in 
equilibrium individual producers’ expected consumption must be the same across all 
communities. Let this common equilibrium level of expected consumption per producer be C. In 
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equilibrium an individual is indifferent between being a producer and a predator. Therefore, in 
equilibrium D = C, or: 
 
( ) Cydp
t
dpyd
t
dD =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= )1(1)1(1 . 
 
This implies 
 
p
pttpd += 1);( .     (5) 
 
Solving (3) and (5) simultaneously, we derive the atomistic equilibrium defense, d(t), and 
predator/producer ratio, p(t). 
 
ttt
ttttd
44121
)4411()(
2
2
+−+−
+−+−= ,  
)1(2
4411)(
2
−
+−−=
t
tttp . 
 
In the atomistic equilibrium, both the predator/producer ratio and defense are an 
increasing function of the efficiency of predation, t, but are independent of the parameters n and 
k for the following reason. The productivity index, y, affects the equilibrium consumption per 
capita, but the equilibrium values of p and d simply insure that all agents have the same expected 
consumption regardless of the level of that consumption. Since the equilibrium values of p and d 
are independent of y, they are independent of the parameters n and k of the productivity index, y. 
Substituting the equilibrium defense and predator/producer ratio into the expected per 
capita consumption function, we derive the atomistic equilibrium consumption as a function of 
the parameters, (n,t,k), as shown in figure 2.1 for fixed k. Note that the equilibrium consumption 
is decreasing in t. It is also inverse U-shaped in n, which reflects the fact that the productivity of 
a producer is subject to positive agglomeration effects over some ranges of community size and 
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negative congestion effects over another ranges, for a fixed value of the production parameter, 
k.7 
 
 
Figure  2.1: Atomistic equilibrium consumption C(n,t), given k = 0.222 
 
 
2.4 GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM 
We now consider the case with a central government that establishes a common defense 
expenditure for all communities. The objective of the central government is to choose a defense 
policy that maximizes consumption per producer, given that individuals are free to choose 
whether to be producers or predators. An individual’s choice of role depends upon the expected 
consumption of a producer relative to the expected consumption of a predator. For n fixed, we 
formalize the central government’s problem as follows: 
 
                                                 
7 The parameter values (n,t,k) used in the numerical analysis are chosen so as to allow for a clear comparison of 
equilibria in the subsequent sections. Extreme parameter values expand the range of degenerate cases such as the 
negative equilibrium level of defense or consumption. For the equilibrium consumption with different values of k, 
see figure A.1 in Appendix B. 
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d
Max  ( ) ydp
t
dpC )1(1 −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+=  
 
s. t. )2( ππ −= ky ,   
n
γπ −= 1 ,   1);(0 ≤−=≤ dt
dtdp ,   , 10 <≤≤ td
 
where p(d;t) is the condition that must be satisfied for individuals to be indifferent between being 
producers and predators. Figure 2.2 represents the graph of the solution to this problem, d(n,t), 
for a fixed value of the production parameter, k. 
 
Figure  2.2: Global equilibrium d(n,t), given k = 0.222  
 
 
 
Since agents adjust to any defense level chosen by the central planner so as to equalize 
the per capita consumption of producers and predators, the net effect of the central planner’s 
decision on per capita consumption of producers depends upon how it influences the productivity 
index, y. This index depends upon both the ratio of predators to producers, p, and on the number 
of communities, n. The marginal effect of p on y depends upon n. When n is small (or, 
equivalently, when π is large), an increase in p increases y as it reduces the congestion effect. But 
when n is large, an increase in p reduces y since it reduces the agglomeration effect. Therefore, 
because the equilibrium value of p is positively related to the defense level, the optimal level of 
defense is lower, the larger is the number of communities. This is reflected in figure 2.2. 
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The relationship between d and n that is induced by the indifference condition relating p 
to d implies that for n sufficiently large the optimal level of defense is 0. That is, a sufficiently 
large number of communities means that, if all agents were producers and no resources were 
devoted to defense, then no agent would be able to secure a higher consumption by switching all 
of his effort from production to predation. With the parameters used in the illustration above, this 
occurs when n ≥ 4. An equilibrium with no defense and no predation is unstable, however, unless 
a switch from producer to predator by a measurable set of agents can be deterred by a threat of 
increasing defense from zero to a level that would reduce the consumption of predators relative 
to producers. Therefore, we assume that when the equilibrium levels of defense and predation are 
0, the central government’s policy can be described as: 
 
σ(p) = [ d = 0  if  p = 0,   d = min {d | C > D}  if  p > 0 ].   (6) 
 
2.5 COMMUNITY EQUILIBRIUM 
2.5.1 Fully rational community equilibrium 
Community defense may be a local government responsibility, rather than a central government 
responsibility. In this event, the level of defense chosen by any one community will have an 
impact not only on (i) the global predator/producer ratio but also upon (ii) the distribution of 
predatory activity across communities, and (iii) the distribution of producers across communities. 
In this section, we characterize the symmetric equilibrium that emerges when each community 
takes into account the way its own policy affects the decisions of individuals with regard to (i) 
whether to produce or predate, (ii) where to live, conditional on being a producer, and (iii) where 
to attack, conditional on being a predator. We characterize the game as a two-stage game. In the 
first stage, communities choose their defense levels. In the second stage, individuals choose their 
roles, with producers choosing where to live and predators choosing where to attack. Allowing 
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individuals to move after every community has set its policy allows each community to account 
for how its policy choice affects patterns of production and predation.8 
A sequentially rational equilibrium requires that following any policy vector chosen by 
local governments in the first stage, the strategies chosen by individuals in the second stage form 
an equilibrium. So we begin with the second stage, given d=(di,d−i). Fix a global 
predator/producer ratio, p. Then the fraction of population who are predators, γ, and the fraction 
of population who are producers, (1−γ), become 
 
p
p
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Then the expected consumption per producer in community i can be expressed as follows: 
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And the expected per predator consumption in community i is 
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For the per capita consumption in a community other than i, we assume that all 
communities except community i follow a symmetric level of defense, d−i, such that the 
probability of any particular community other than i being attacked by a predator is G−i = 
(1−Gi)/(n−1). We also assume that all producers except those in community i are uniformly 
distributed over (n−1) number of communities such that π−i = ((1−γ)−πi)/(n−1). Then the 
expected per producer consumption in a community other than i, becomes 
                                                 
8 By contrast, if communities and individuals had to move simultaneously, then each community would have to act 
as if it had no influence on the predator/producer ratio, on the distribution of producers over communities, or on the 
likelihood of being attacked. In effect, in a one-shot simultaneous move game, a community would act as though it 
had no more influence on the behaviors of individuals than does any individual producer within that community. 
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Similarly, the expected per predator consumption in a community other than i is 
 
)2()1(1 iiiii kdt
dD −−−−− −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= ππ .    (10) 
 
Given the policy vector d, the optimal behavior of individuals in the second stage 
requires that individuals must be indifferent about where they choose to live and what role to 
assume. This yields three indifference conditions, Ci = Di = C−i = D−i. For any given community 
policy vector d and the parameters (n,t,k), these conditions determine the symmetric equilibrium 
p, G, and distribution of producers over communities.9 
Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 below show the properties of the symmetric equilibrium in 
the second stage as a function of the policy vector chosen by the communities and particular 
values for the parameters, n, t, and k. These reflect the equilibrium indifference conditions, Ci = 
Di = C−i = D−i. For the given parameter values when the policy vector is (di, d−i) = (0, 0.30809), 
notice that 20% of the population is predators but none of the predators attack community i. This 
is because more than 50% of the producers live in community i. In this community, production is 
taking place in the region where congestion dominates agglomeration while in the other 
community agglomeration relatively outweighs congestion in the production function. 
Consequently, producers in the other community are much more productive and represent a 
better ‘target’ for predators. As community i raises its defense level above zero, the tax drives 
some producers in its community into predation. Furthermore, this increased productivity in 
community i induces some producers in community −i to become predators, which increases 
productivity in community −i as well. Therefore, the overall predator/producer ratio increases as 
di increases. 
                                                 
9 In the interests of space, the explicit derivation of the equilibrium strategy in the second stage is omitted and is 
available upon request. 
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Figure  2.3: πi(di), given (d−i, n, t, k) = (0.30809, 2, 0.9, 0.222) 
 
 
Figure  2.4: Gi(di), given (d−i, n, t, k) = (0.30809, 2, 0.9, 0.222) 
 
 
 
Figure  2.5: p(di), given (d−i, n, t, k) = (0.30809, 2, 0.9, 0.222) 
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Figure  2.6: Ci(di) = Di(di) = C−i(di) = D−i(di), given (d−i, n, t, k) = (0.30809, 2, 0.9, 0.222) 
 
 
 
Given the strategy chosen by individuals in the second stage, the problem facing 
community i in the first stage is 
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s. t. ,   ),( ii ddpp −= ),( iiii ddGG −= ,   ),( iiii dd −= ππ , 
 
0≥p , 10 <≤≤ tdi , 11 =∑ =ni iG , 
 
where p(di,d−i), Gi(di,d−i), and πi(di,d−i) are the equilibrium second-stage responses of individuals 
to the policy vector d. 
Differentiating the per capita consumption with respect to di and substituting the 
equilibrium condition d−i = di into the first-order condition yields the fixed-point at which all 
communities have the same defense level. The fixed-point is the symmetric equilibrium level of 
defense of local communities (see Appendix A for a full description of equilibrium). 
In the second stage equilibrium, agents adjust to any policy vector so as to satisfy the 
indifference conditions. This implies that if community i can raise the per capita consumption of 
its producers by changing its defense level, it will induce a change in the behavior of agents that 
raises the consumption of all agents, not simply those who are producers in community i. 
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2.5.1.1 The fully rational community equilibrium is socially optimal.  
 
The responses made in the second stage to any variation in the policy vector chosen in the first 
stage are independent of the process that produced that variation. Therefore, the response of 
agents to a change in di is the same whether this change is made by the local government in 
community i or by a central planner. Therefore, a central planner who wishes to choose a policy 
vector to maximize the per capita consumption of producers is subject to the same constraints 
created by the action of agents in the second stage game as is any local government. If we re-
write the central planner’s objective as 
d
Max  )(1
1
d∑ == nj jCnZ , 
 
where Cj(d) incorporates the equilibrium second-stage responses, then the first-order conditions 
are 
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The nature of the second stage response equalizes the consumption of all agents, 
regardless of whether an agent is a producer or a predator, regardless of where a producer 
produces, and regardless of where a predator chooses to attack. Therefore, the following two 
conditions hold: 
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A local government has no interest in the consumption of any agent who is not a producer 
in its own jurisdiction. Nevertheless, a fully rational local government recognizes that a change 
in its own policy can only benefit its own producers if that change induces a response by agents 
that leads to an increase in the consumption per capita of all agents in the economy. This is 
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reflected in the best response function of a fully rational local government. Consequently, given 
the defense policy of all other local governments, the local government in community i changes 
its own defense level in exactly the same way as a central planner would do so. This is what 
produces the identity between the equilibrium achieved among fully rational local governments 
and the optimal defense chosen by a central planner. 
2.5.2 Boundedly rational community equilibrium 
We now assume that local governments are boundedly rational in the sense that they take as 
given the global predator/producer ratio, p, and the distribution of producer activity, (πi, π−i). But 
each community is assumed to anticipate that predators distribute their attacks across 
communities in a way that will maximize a predator’s expected consumption. By changing its 
own level of defense, therefore, a community believes it can affect the probability that a predator 
will attack one of its producers. We continue to assume that producers are distributed uniformly 
over communities such that πi = π−i = (1−γ)/n, conditional on p. Assuming that all other 
communities except community i follow a common level of defense, d−i, the anticipated behavior 
of a predator is characterized as the solution to the following problem: 
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Or, by the symmetry assumption for the communities other than i, 
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Differentiating (11) with respect to Gi, we can derive the critical level of defense of 
community i from the first-order condition. Let this critical level of defense be . Then 
the rule for distribution of predatory efforts of a predator is derived as follows: 
),;(ˆ tndd ii −
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Community i must, therefore, decide whether it is better to set its level of defense at the 
critical level, and be free of predators, or below the critical level. Let Cia(d−i,p;n,t,k) denote the 
per capita consumption of its producers when community i sets its defense at . 
Alternatively, given that it chooses a level of defense below the critical level, its optimal choice 
satisfies the solution to 
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Let Cib(p;n,t,k) denote the per capita consumption when community i chooses the optimal 
level of defense, di(p;n,t), conditional on di < . Therefore, its best choice is the max 
{Cia(d−i,p;n,t,k), Cib(p;n,t,k)}. The symmetric Nash equilibrium requires that the symmetric level 
of defense elsewhere, d−i, must be chosen so as to make community i indifferent between 
Cia(d−i,p;n,t,k) and Cib(p;n,t,k). Using this indifference condition, we derive the fixed-point level 
of defense, d(p;n,t), as shown in figure 2.7 for fixed t. 
),;(ˆ tndd ii −
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Figure  2.7: Fixed-point d(p;n), given t = 0.9 
 
 
As n increases, the fraction of producers who are located in any one community 
decreases. When one small community increases its defense level, the induced increase in 
predatory activity summed over all other communities is smaller than when a large community 
increases its defense level. Consequently, the induced response of other communities to an 
increase in the defense level of community i is smaller, the smaller is community i (or, 
equivalently, the larger is n). Because the conditional responsiveness of other communities to 
any increase in defense by community i depends on the percentage of population in i, as n 
increases and this percentage decreases, the equilibrium level of defense increases. 
Solving simultaneously the indifference condition (5) and the symmetric equilibrium condition 
Cia(d−i,p;n,t,k) = Cib(p;n,t,k), we obtain the symmetric equilibrium level of defense, d(n,t), and 
predator/producer ratio, p(n,t). 
 
2.6 A COMPARISON OF EQUILIBRIA 
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 compare the equilibrium defense levels and consumption levels under 
atomistic competition and boundedly rational community competition. 
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Figure  2.8: Atomistic equilibrium d(n,t) (top) and boundedly rational community equilibrium d(n,t) 
(bottom) 
 
 
 
 
Figure  2.9: Atomistic equilibrium C(n,t) (bottom with large n) and boundedly rational community 
equilibrium C(n,t) (top with large n), given k = 0.222 
 
 
 
Observe that the boundedly rational community equilibrium level of defense is 
decreasing in the number of communities, and it is lower than the atomistic equilibrium level of 
defense that is independent of the number of communities. The reason is that an increase in any 
one community’s defense level reduces p, and, ceteris paribus, reductions in p reduce the optimal 
level of defense for any community. Since an individual is of measure zero, no individual’s level 
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of defense relative to that of other individuals can influence p and, therefore, cannot influence 
any other individual’s best response function through this channel. However, a community is not 
of measure zero, so it does influence other community’s reactions to its own level of defense 
through two channels: (1) the relative defense level effect, which induces a positive reaction and 
(2) the average defense level effect, an effect on p that induces a reduction in defense by others. 
It is this second effect that accounts for the lower equilibrium level of defense in the community 
equilibrium than in the atomistic equilibrium. 
A lower equilibrium defense level and predator/producer ratio achieved by switching 
from atomistic competition to community competition does not imply that equilibrium 
consumption levels will always be increased by such a switch. While the producers in a 
community gain by paying lower taxes and by being subject to a lower probability of attack, 
fewer predators mean that each community will have a larger fraction of the global population 
engaged in production within that community. The productivity of a producer depends non-
linearly on the fraction of the global population that is producing in the same location. Therefore, 
it is possible that when the number of communities is small, the decline in productivity induced 
by the congestion created by a larger population of producers more than offsets the consumption 
savings associated with the lower tax rate and the lower probability of being attacked. Figure 2.9 
shows that this is, in fact, true when k = 0.222, t ≤ 0.9, n < 4, and communities do not anticipate 
how p will change as they change their own defense levels.10 
The assumption that boundedly rational communities do not anticipate the change in p 
that their choice of d induces is crucial. If, as in fully rational community model, this effect is 
fully anticipated, then a community’s best response function will reflect the effect of its own 
choice of defense on the size of its producer population and, therefore, on the productivity of its 
producers. When increases in defense spending per producer induce a reduction in the population 
of producers that raises output per producer by more (less) than the increased sum of tax per 
producer and expected loss to predation per producer, communities that fully anticipate this 
effect will select a higher (lower) defense level than would be chosen by boundedly rational 
communities. This is reflected in figure 2.10, where for a sufficiently small number of 
communities, defense expenditure per capita is higher in the fully rational community 
                                                 
10 For a comparison of equilibria with different values of k, see figure A1 in Appendix B. 
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equilibrium than in the boundedly rational community equilibrium. For a larger number of 
communities, the opposite is true. Consequently, as is shown in figure 2.11, for all values of n 
the consumption level in the competitive community equilibrium when communities fully 
anticipate this effect is always higher than that which is achieved in either the atomistic 
equilibrium or the community competitive equilibrium without anticipation of this effect. 
 
Figure  2.10: Atomistic d(n,t) (top), boundedly rational community d(n,t) (bottom), and fully rational 
community d(n,t) (penetrating), given k = 0.222 
 
 
 
Figure  2.11: Fully rational community C(n,t) (top), boundedly rational community C(n,t) (middle with 
large n), and atomistic C(n,t) (bottom with large n), given k = 0.222 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have analyzed the extension of a model of production and predation due to 
Grossman (1998) to a multiple community setting. In a multiple community setting, defense 
expenditures in any one community have the property of a local public good within that 
community. We assume that predators are free to roam. We also assume, as in Grossman, that 
individuals can choose whether to be producers or predators. Therefore, defense against 
predation in any one locale generates a series of effects on other communities. These effects 
include changes in the distribution of population among communities, the redistribution of 
predatory effort over communities, and an induced change in the predator/producer ratio in the 
economy as a whole. A defense-induced reduction in the global predator/producer ratio raises the 
percentage of output consumed by producers. However, a reduction in the predator/producer 
ratio also increases the number of producers in each locale. This increase in the number of 
producers can either raise, or lower productivity through scale effects. These scale effects depend 
upon both the number of communities and properties of the production function. 
In equilibrium all individuals have the same level of consumption regardless of whether 
they are producers or predators and regardless of where any producer lives. The question we 
address in this paper is whether the level of defense chosen by local governments so as to 
maximize the per capita consumption of their own producers, given defense levels elsewhere, 
always produces a second-best outcome. Our analysis shows that the answer to this question is a 
qualified “No.” Under some parametric conditions, unless local governments anticipate the 
effects of their defense decisions on the global predator/producer ratio and its consequences for 
productivity, the equilibrium level of per capita consumption is actually higher when each 
individual producer must determine how much effort to devote to defense than when each 
community decides how much its own producers will devote to defense. In particular, with a 
small number of large local communities and with a high level of effectiveness of defense, 
competition among local governments who do not take into account the effects of their actions 
on the global predator/producer ratio may produce a lower equilibrium level of per capita 
consumption than would occur if all defense decisions were made at the individual level. 
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However, if communities are fully rational and anticipate the equilibrating behavior of agents, 
then the community equilibrium is the first best. 
 In our model, all agents are identical. Therefore, there is no inherent reason for 
communities to be different in any respect in equilibrium. By concentrating on this special case, 
we are able to highlight the important difference between the equilibrium outcomes that emerge 
when local governments are fully rational and when they are not. Of course, we observe that 
communities in the real world are not identical. To capture this aspect of reality we would have 
to consider agents who differ either by productivity, or by preferences, or both. More productive 
agents have more to lose to a predator than do less productive agents. Therefore, they would 
presumably be willing to devote a larger fraction of their endowments to defense than would less 
productive types. How this difference in willingness to pay for defense would be reflected in 
equilibrium generated by competing local governments, and indeed whether an equilibrium 
exists, might well depend upon assumptions that are made with regard to how a government 
determines how much each individual in its jurisdiction is required to pay for their own defense. 
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3.0  DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION IN A MODEL OF LOCAL COMMUNITY 
COMPETITION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Communities compete to attract and retain economic resources.11 This competition typically 
involves a community adopting a fiscal policy that discriminates in favor of economic resources 
that are not currently located in that community. Such discrimination in favor of ‘newcomers,’ or 
‘outsiders,’ tends to be a permanent feature of local fiscal policies. Since resources that locate in 
a particular community tend to remain in that same community for an extended period of time, 
current ‘outsiders’ can anticipate being subject to future tax treatment as an ‘insider’ and have to 
pay for the favorable tax treatment extended to future ‘newcomers.’ Consequently, it is not 
obvious why the local favorable tax treatment of ‘outsiders’ should have any effect on the 
location decisions of ‘outsiders.’ But, if the location decisions of ‘outsiders’ cannot be expected 
to be influenced by such incentives, then why have they become a permanent feature of the tax 
systems of local governments? The objective of this paper is to explain why local fiscal 
competition leads to such discriminatory tax policies and to analyze the consequences of this 
type of tax discrimination. 
There are controversies in the voluminous literature of tax competition as to whether 
competition among localities for new investments leads to an outcome which is worse than 
would occur when there is no competition at all.12 According to a negative view of tax 
competition, communities try to outbid one another in order to attract new investments the 
                                                 
11 For an empirical study of strategic tax competition, see Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). 
12 See, for example, Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Wilson (1999) for a comprehensive survey of tax competition 
literature. 
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amount of which is fixed in the economy as a whole, leading themselves to a “race to the 
bottom.” The results of our analysis do not support this negative view of tax competition. 
Specifically, we will show that there is a natural limit to the degree of discrimination in local tax 
policies between old investments and new investments. Furthermore, this discrimination does not 
lead to an equilibrium that is worse for anybody than would occur if competition were not 
allowed. 
Our results share some features in common with other papers that have addressed 
differential tax treatment of economic resources based on mobility. Wilson (1985) presents a 
model where a large number of small regions engage in tax competition for mobile capital which 
is both used as a complementary input to the labor supplied by immobile residents and taxed to 
finance local public expenditures. He was able to show that the optimal property taxation chosen 
by local communities so as to maximize their own residents’ utility calls for a lower tax on the 
capital that is used to produce a nationally traded good, which is exchanged for capital and 
whose demand is infinitely price elastic, than the tax on the capital that is used to produce a non-
tradable local good. In contrast, we treat the mobile resources as technically identical to the 
immobile resources, i.e. perfect substitutes. Accordingly, in our model a local government’s 
policy affects the size of its community, rather than the mix of economic factors. 
The boundedness in the degree of tax competition is investigated in Wilson (1986). Based 
on the same model as in Wilson (1985), Wilson studies the optimal public policy from a local 
region’s viewpoint, i.e. the tax rates on mobile capital and capital-labor ratio in public 
production. His analysis emphasizes that the condition for tax competition to take place depends 
upon the production technologies for public goods, factor substitutability, and elasticity of 
substitution between private goods. The equilibrium tax policy in our model also shows 
explicitly the intensity of tax competition as a function of certain parameters in closed form. 
In an economy in which agents’ productivity is exposed to risks, factor mobility can have 
significant implications for income redistribution. Wildasin (1995) utilizes a simple model that 
captures the risk shifting of mobile factors to immobile factors, which results in a greater 
expected mean income for immobile factors than would occur in the absence of variable factor’s 
spatial arbitrage. The patterns and consequences of risk shifting are similar to our results, 
although the process that generates such results is different. In his model, the mobility of agents 
and the size of immobile agents are exogenously given and there is no incentive for local 
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governments to engage in tax competition. By contrast, in our model all agents are mobile when 
“young” and immobile when “old” and the size of a community is endogenously determined as a 
result of strategic interactions among communities who compete for mobile factors. 
Wildasin and Wilson (1998) consider the spatial diversification of income risks through 
cross-ownership of shares in firms in a tax competition setting. In their model, the first-best 
outcome of risk-pooling through full diversification is achieved in the absence of tax 
competition. This is so because local governments engage in confiscatory taxation on immobile 
factors owned by non-residents. However, when local governments must levy uniform property 
taxes on both variable and fixed factors, the mobility of one factor alleviates the confiscatory 
taxation on the other immobile factor, given a reasonable substitutability between these factors. 
Yet, in their model, the fact that non-residents might anticipate such confiscatory taxation of 
communities on immobile assets is not considered. By contrast, the anticipatory behavior of non-
residents before they commit their resources to a particular community is an essential element of 
the model we propose below. Somewhat surprisingly, agents’ rational expectations, combined 
with the competitive pressure facing communities, greatly simplify the derivation of equilibrium 
tax policies. Furthermore, in our analysis tax competition does not introduce distortions. 
The closest model to ours is presented in Wildasin and Wilson (1996) in which workers 
who live for two periods are free to choose a town to reside and work while young so as to 
maximize their expected discounted lifetime net income. After the first period of life, they can 
relocate themselves with a moving cost which is randomly distributed and privately known to 
each worker in the second period. Appropriately, each local government sets tax policies so as to 
maximize its land value. Given the moving costs, which give the town monopsony power over 
the stayer wage, the steady state young wage is greater than that of old stayer wage, resulting in 
inefficiency borne by workers. 
In what follows, we take a slightly different modeling strategy, one that is actually more 
realistic and greatly simplifies our analysis of the questions we want to address. We will assume 
an infinite cost of relocation. The objective of a local government in our model is to maximize 
the welfare of its existing old residents whose resources are embedded in its community. In our 
analysis, different from the result in Wildasin and Wilson (1996), the “intergenerational income 
transfer” from the old to the young has a natural bound, the magnitude of which is determined by 
parameters. 
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The rest of paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in the following 
section. Then we derive the steady state equilibrium tax policy. Conclusion sums up the results. 
 
3.2 THE MODEL 
The economy consists of two regions, A and B, in which production takes place. In each period, a 
unit mass of two-period lived agents are born such that there are two generations of the same size 
of individuals at any point in time. Let Oi,t be the size of old agents and Ni,t the size of new agents 
in community i in period t such that OA,t + OB,t = NA,t + NB,t = 1. New agents are endowed with a 
unit mass of inalienable and durable resources.13 In the first period, agents are mobile and must 
choose a community in which to reside and to locate their resources. In the second period, an 
agent is a member of a community chosen in the first period of life and the agent’s resources 
must be used within that particular community. The resources of both old and new residents in a 
community are used to produce an output through a production technology that exhibits 
diminishing marginal productivity. The price of output is normalized to one, so the total value of 
output in community i in period t is (Oi,t + Ni,t)α, 0 < α < 1. 
Each community must finance a local public good, which requires a fixed amount of 
expenditures, F.14 Existing residents benefit from attracting new residents and their resources 
whose output can be taxed to help finance the local public good. However, this benefit is limited 
by the fact that as the size of the community grows output per capita tends to diminish. In effect, 
old-timers will have two tax bills, one for financing the local public good and the other for 
attracting newcomers. Equivalently, all residents pay the same tax per capita, but upon arrival 
new residents receive an entry bonus, b, which can be either positive or negative. It is this bonus 
that represents a discriminatory tax system. 
                                                 
13 Since economic factors are not differentiated from one another in the present model, we simply regard an agent’s 
resources as labor and the income generated by his/her resources as wage income. 
14 We assume F is large enough for interior solutions such that both communities have population. 
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In each period, the game proceeds in two stages. In stage one, each community sets a tax 
policy so as to maximize the after-tax per capita income of its existing, old residents, taking as 
given the tax policy of the other community. In stage two, each new agent chooses a community 
in which to reside and to locate their resources so as to maximize the discounted present value of 
expected lifetime after-tax income, given the profile of tax policies adopted by communities. 
Potential entrants are forward looking. They recognize that the expected lifetime net income of 
entry into a community depends upon (1) the present size of its existing population, (2) its tax 
policy when they first enter that community, and (3) its expected size and related tax policy of 
their chosen community in the second period of their lives, when they and their resources have 
become immobile. In the following period, the old residents die, new residents become old, and 
new agents are born. And the game proceeds in the same way. 
We are interested in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which identical agents or 
communities choose the same strategy. Also the equilibrium must be sequentially rational such 
that each community chooses a tax policy in anticipation of the new agents’ response, taking as 
given the tax policy of the other community. Then the problem facing community A is stated as 
follows: 
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where τA,t is an income tax rate and bA,t is the size of bonus per newcomer of community A in 
period t. Similarly, we can define the after-tax per capita income of old residents in community 
B, yB,t, and its objective with constraints. The first constraint reflects the assumption of balanced 
budget. That is, communities spend their tax revenue on financing the local public good and 
bonuses to new entrants without surplus or deficit. The second constraint is a function of vectors 
of bonuses and distribution of old agents, which is derived from the new agents’ behavior in 
stage two. From a new agent’s viewpoint, his/her strategy is 
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  Go to community A if { }1,,, +++ tAtAtA yby δ  > { }1,,, +++ tBtBtB yby δ , 
 Go to community B if { }1,,, +++ tAtAtA yby δ  < { }1,,, +++ tBtBtB yby δ , 
 Choose randomly if { }1,,, +++ tAtAtA yby δ  = { }1,,, +++ tBtBtB yby δ , 
 
where δ is a discount factor, 0 < δ < 1.15 
Observe that when a community determines the income tax rate, the size of bonus is also 
determined through the constraints on budget balance and the strategy of possible newcomers. 
Then we can rewrite a community’s problem as choosing the size of bonus paid to each new 
entrant: 
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3.3 THE STEADY STATE 
Proposition 1. 
Suppose that there is k ≥ 2 number of communities. In the steady state, all communities are of the 
same size and adopt the same tax policy: 
                                                 
15 Variables yA,t, yA,t+1, yB,t, yB,t+1, should be understood in expected terms. For notational simplicity, the notation for 
expectation is suppressed. 
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Proof.   The first-order condition for the solution, bi, to community’s problem (1), given 
bj≠i, is 
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We know that in the steady state a new entrant must be indifferent to place of entry, i.e. yi 
+ bi + δyi = yj + bj + δyj. In the steady state by symmetry, yi = yj. So the indifference condition in 
the steady state is yi = yj + bj −bi. Differentiating the steady state indifference condition with 
respect to bi yields 
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Since the terms in brackets are zero in equilibrium due to community A’s optimization, 
we can rearrange the equation as follows: 
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N . Substitute equation (3) into the first-order 
condition (2) for community A. 
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 Evaluation of equation (4) when Oi = Ni = Oj = Nj = k
1  yields the following reaction function for 
community i: 
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Similarly, community j’s reaction function is ⎟⎟⎠
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impose the symmetry condition bi (bj) = bj (bi) to find the fixed point. Thus, we have the steady 
state bonus, ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
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k
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α 21* . The steady state annual after-tax per capita income of the old 
and the young follows immediately.   Q.E.D. 
 
In equilibrium, the tax system provides positive entry bonuses to newcomers, even when 
both communities are identical and could attract the same number of newcomers as they would if 
there were no bonuses at all.16 Note that, in stage two, as long as bonuses are the same across 
communities, newcomers are equally divided. However, competition between communities 
implies that in equilibrium their tax policy must discriminate in favor of newcomers by paying 
positive bonuses. 
Importantly, the bonus is finite, so that there is not a “race to the bottom,” but instead the 
equilibrium bonus is determined by the parameters of the production function and the magnitude 
of the fixed cost associated with the local public good.17 The intuition is straightforward. The 
                                                 
16 We assume (α−1+F) > 0. 
17 When k increases, the equilibrium bonus per new agent increases, altering the lifetime distribution of income by 
raising income when young and reducing income when old. The intuition behind this comparative statics is as 
follows. As k increases, the size of a community decreases. Consequently, each new worker has a smaller negative 
impact on average productivity than the positive impact on reducing the cost per old worker of financing the local 
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larger α is, the smaller is the marginal cost of newcomers to old-timers associated with the 
declining average productivity. And a large F implies a large marginal contribution of 
newcomers to old-timers through sharing the fixed cost of the local public good. Therefore, an 
increase in (α, F) makes communities more aggressive in attracting newcomers by offering 
larger bonuses. 
Notice that tax competition results in an “intergenerational income transfer” from the old 
to the young.18 Would this income transfer have an effect on efficiency? The answer is “No.” 
Although agents receive a higher income when young, in our model there is no opportunity to 
save at a positive interest rate, which would allow a higher sustainable level of consumption 
throughout their lifetime.19 Therefore, if individuals smooth their consumption path over their 
lifetime, they have the same consumption path as they would have in the absence of competition. 
 
3.3.1 Discriminatory taxation is welfare improving. 
In the absence of discriminatory taxation, there are three steady state distributions of population: 
One of the two communities contains entire population. Each community has the same size of 
old-timers and newcomers. Because of declining marginal productivity, it will not generally be 
in the interest of old timers who are concentrated in a single community to have all of the 
newcomers join them.  However, without the ability to impose an entry fee, if that community 
should become populated with all of the newcomers, no newcomer would find it in his/her 
interest to move away since a newcomer who does so would have to bear the full cost of 
providing the public good in the other community.  With the possibility of charging a negative 
bonus, or entry fee, a community that currently has entire population of old-timers can control 
                                                                                                                                                             
public good. Therefore, as k increases, old workers in any community have an increased incentive to attempt to 
attract new workers. 
18 In the absence of competition, the discounted present value of expected lifetime after-tax per capita income would 
be (1−F) + δ(1−F), while with competition it is α + δ{(1−F)−(α−1+F)}. Thus, the amount of income transfer is 
(α−1+F). 
19 This kind of income transfer might have an effect on a long-term growth path of an economy, if one were to 
consider a model in which individuals have opportunities to place savings into productive assets. Since young 
people receive a bonus, they would have an incentive to save some portion of the bonus in order to smooth their 
consumption path at a higher sustainable level. However, we abstract from such opportunities of investment. 
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the number of newcomers who will find it profitable to enter.  They can, therefore, prevent the 
volume of new entrants from exceeding the number that maximizes the after-tax income of the 
old-timers in that community.  Consequently, in the presence of discriminatory taxation, when it 
is not optimal for everyone to be in a single community the only steady state is the equal division 
of population. Since a degenerate distribution of population generally provides a lower after-tax 
income per capita than would be generated by the equilibrium in which population is equally 
divided, the availability of discriminatory taxation can actually guarantee that the Pareto superior 
equilibrium is realized. That is, discriminatory taxation serves social purpose.20 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have analyzed discriminatory taxation in a model of local community 
competition within the context of a dynamic, overlapping generations model. A community 
chooses a tax policy each period to maximize the after-tax per capita income of its existing, old 
residents, taking as given the tax policy of other communities, anticipating the new agents’ 
response. Existing residents benefit from attracting new residents and their resources whose 
output can be taxed to help finance the local public good. But this benefit is limited by the fact 
that as the size of the community grows output per capita diminishes. The tax policy specifies 
that all residents pay the same tax per capita, but upon arrival new residents receive an entry 
bonus, which can be either positive or negative. It is this bonus that represents a discriminatory 
tax system. 
The bonus is finite, so that there is not a “race to the bottom.” Although the equilibrium 
tax policy results in an “intergenerational income transfer” from the old to the young, agents 
have the same consumption path as they would have in the absence of competition. While entry 
bonuses and fees are motivated by individual community strategic concerns, our analysis does 
                                                 
20  In this model, entry fees and bonuses have the same effect as zoning regulations on minimum housing 
expenditures in the model of Hamilton (1976).  They serve to insure that newcomers take into account the effect of 
their location decisions on others. 
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suggest that strategic discriminatory taxation may well be welfare improving, relative to the tax 
regime that forces communities to adopt the same tax policy.  In a world with both local 
congestion and local public goods they help to internalize externalities. 
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4.0  A NOTE ON THE EFFECTS OF TAX INCREMENT FINANCING ON THE 
PATH OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Tax increment financing (TIF) is a financing device a local government uses for development. 
The sponsoring jurisdiction (municipality) makes a commitment to financing a portion of the 
development of the property. Typically, it issues bonds to finance its share of the development 
cost. The taxing authority then pays the bonds by dedicating the increment of tax revenue the 
property generates once developed, relative to its predevelopment assessed value, to paying off 
these bond obligations. In effect, the private developer receives assets from the taxing authority. 
TIF began in California in 1952 as a means of generating local matching funds for 
federally funded development projects (Huddleston 1982). However, it was not until the mid-
1970s that TIF gained its popularity.21 There are three principal reasons for adoption of TIF. 
First, TIF creates a development zone (TIF district) to internalize externalities associated with 
the development of various parcels in the neighborhood that has become blighted. A blighted 
neighborhood is one in which it would be profitable to convert all of the properties in the 
neighborhood to another use, but would not be profitable to convert only a portion of the 
properties. That is, the conversion of properties to more intensive uses require public 
investments, for example, in site assembly, transportation, and communication, which involve 
                                                 
21 By 1970 seven states had authorized TIF (Wyatt 1990). By 1984 twenty-eight states (Greuling 1987), by 1992 
forty-four states (Forgey 1993), and by 1997 forty-eight states had passed legislation authorizing TIF (Johnson and 
Kriz 2001). Johnson and Man (eds. 2001) provide comprehensive studies on TIF, such as working processes, scales 
of TIF bonds, determinants of TIF adoption, effects on economic development, history, and selected state by state 
examples. 
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collective action among developers for that type of investment to take place.22 Therefore, a 
parcel of land that is left underdeveloped exerts negative externalities on its neighbors by not 
sharing the development cost and by lowering the value of other developed land in its 
neighborhood. The capital investment made by the municipality in a TIF district internalizes 
these externalities.23 
Second, TIF coordinates development investments of multiple taxing jurisdictions. Once 
development is made in a TIF district by a municipality with subsequent increase in tax base, 
other taxing jurisdictions would benefit from the development without having made any 
contributions. The municipality alone would bear the burden of the development cost, while the 
benefits of development have to be shared by other local taxing bodies. TIF preempts such a 
free-riding problem by committing multiple taxing jurisdictions to sharing the development cost 
in proportion to their benefits by not collecting the increment of tax revenue in the TIF district 
for the duration of TIF. 
Third, TIF reduces the economic distortions of property taxation on new development. It 
is this motivation for adoption of TIF on which we focus. Typically, the pattern of 
transformation of land use is affected by a property tax, when it is levied on both land and 
structures.24 We know that a tax on structures tends to discourage the intensity of development 
and tends to delay the conversion of properties to more intensive uses. TIF can be viewed as a 
fiscal policy to compensate for these negative effects of property taxes and improve the 
intertemporal use of the developed land.25 
Tax increment financing provides a subsidy to developers who convert qualifying 
property from less intensive to more intensive use. Arnott and Lewis (1979) provide a dynamic 
                                                 
22 Brueckner (1997) presents a model in which he investigates how different schemes for financing public 
investments affect the speed of urban spread. TIF can be viewed as a financing scheme for infrastructure in which 
the city’s existing landowners share the cost of required public investments for newly-developed land. 
23 Most states require a “blight finding” to establish a TIF district and to make TIF serve as a revitalization tool 
(Johnson and Kriz 2001). However, the notion of “blight” has been used in a very expansive fashion by 
municipalities so as to add “economic development” as one of the allowable purposes, effectively making TIF a 
regular development tool. See Luce (2003) for a critical review of the use of TIFs as a revenue-capturing device by 
the suburban affluent cities in St. Louis metropolitan areas. 
24 See, for example, Ladd (1998) for summaries on the effects of property taxation on investment decisions. 
25 Prior empirical studies have focused on the degree of which TIF has actually influenced the aggregate level of 
capital investment in communities that have adopted TIF. The central question on the effectiveness of TIF is 
whether TIF creates investments that otherwise could not take place. The critics of TIF suggest that TIFs simply 
relocate investments that otherwise would occur outside the TIF district. See Man and Rosentraub (1998) for the 
positive effects of TIFs on economic activities. For the ineffectiveness of TIFs, see Dye and Merriman (2003). 
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optimization model of an investor’s decision to convert property from one use to another. 
McFarlane (1999) uses this model to investigate the effects of various types of development fees 
as well as property taxes on the timing of development, capital intensity, and urban spread. 
Capozza and Li (1994) also use an optimal stopping time approach to study the effects of 
property taxes on the pattern of land development when rents are stochastic. These models 
assume that conversion of property only occurs once. However, unlike the taxes and fees that are 
analyzed in these models, the magnitude of the subsidy that a developer gets from tax increment 
financing depends upon the intensity of use of the property in its pre-conversion, non-qualifying 
use. Therefore, now that TIF is a regular feature of local fiscal policies, it is important to ask how 
this policy will affect prior, non-qualifying uses of property. In particular, while TIFs reduce the 
distortionary effects of property taxation on uses that qualify, they introduce distortions on non-
qualifying uses. As we will show, the net effect of TIFs on the dynamic path of property 
transformation depends on the magnitude of the effective subsidy to TIF qualifying uses. We 
identify what distortions TIF creates and evaluate their consequences, relative to desirable 
consequences of TIF, for shaping the dynamic path of land transformation from one use to 
another. 
We consider the evolution of use of property to take place in two phases. In the early 
phase, land is used in a way that does not qualify for tax increment financing. In the second 
phase, the property is converted to a use that does qualify for TIF. Our analysis shows that unlike 
a reduction in property tax that induces an increase in capital investment in both phases, a TIF 
will induce a reduction in capital investment in the first phase. The reason for this effect is that 
by reducing the level of capital investment in the first, non-qualifying stage, a developer secures 
a lower tax base from which the TIF subsidy is computed and gets a larger subsidy for any given 
amount of TIF qualifying investment. Consequently, as we show, the net effect of a TIF on the 
dynamic efficiency of land use depends critically on the size of the TIF, relative to the capital 
investment that qualifies for the TIF. 
The next section introduces the model and studies the path of property conversions to 
more intensive uses in the absence of taxes and subsidies as a benchmark. Then we will analyze 
the effects of TIF in the interaction with property taxation on the path of property conversions. 
The results are summed up in the conclusion. 
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4.2 THE MODEL 
We assume that the community is interested in the value of its land and the tax stream that 
development of that land can generate. It makes TIF available to developers who wish to convert 
land from less capital intensive to more capital intensive use. Therefore, we utilize a model in 
which land has two possible uses, “residential” and “commercial.” Only “commercial” use 
qualifies for a TIF. Further, we assume that in the earliest stages it is more profitable to use the 
land in a way that does not qualify for TIF. Therefore, the use of the land must be transformed at 
some point in time from a non-qualifying use to a qualifying use. We analyze how the 
availability of a TIF affects (1) the time at which the land is developed for a non-qualifying use, 
(2) the level of investment in the early non-qualifying use, (3) the time at which the use is 
converted to a qualifying use, and (4) the level of investment made in the qualifying use. 
These four decisions made by the land developer will, in turn, determine the discounted 
present values of the community’s land and the tax stream that the use of that land generates. 
Therefore, our analysis will reveal how the sum of discounted present values of land plus tax 
revenue is affected by the magnitude of the TIF subsidy. 
We extend the Arnott and Lewis model so as to allow for a replacement of structures with 
conversion costs so that the use of land can be transformed twice. Associated with each possible 
use is a rental flow per unit of housing/office space created by the capital, K, devoted to that use: 
rr(t) for residential use and rc(t) for commercial use at time t. Like Arnott and Lewis, we assume 
that rents before development are zero, and rental rates are expected to grow at a constant rate, η 
> 0: 
tertr η)0()( = , 
where r(0) is the rent at time zero such that the residential use of land generates a higher return 
per unit of capital than the commercial use of land does at time zero: rr(0) > rc(0). But the rate of 
increase of rent per unit of capital from commercial use is greater than that from residential use: 
ηc > ηr. This reflects the fact that it takes time for a market to evolve in favor of commercial 
activities.  
We further assume that the price of a unit of capital, p, is constant, structures do not 
depreciate, and the output of housing/office space on a unit of land, Q(K), increases in K at a 
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diminishing rate: Q′(K) > 0 and Q″(K) < 0. We also assume that it costs a fraction of the 
development cost to demolish the old (residential) structure, K(r), before a new (commercial) 
structure, K(c), can be built on the land. That is, the replacement cost is {dpK(r)} at the time when 
the new investment is made, where d is a replacement cost parameter: 0 < d < 1. Let T denote the 
timing of property conversions to more intensive uses. 
Then, in the absence of property taxation and tax increment financing, the land 
developer’s problem can be written as follows: 
},{ KT
Max   ),( KTL
= ,   (1) ( ) c
c
r
c
r
iT
cr
it
ccT
iT
r
it
rr
T
T
eKdKpdteKQtrepKdteKQtr −−
∞−− +−+− ∫∫ )()()()(
where T = (Tr, Tc), K = (Kr, Kc), and i is the interest rate. Subscripts represent the type of 
development: ‘r’ for residential use and ‘c’ for commercial use of land. For the solution to this 
dynamic problem, we invoke backward induction and solve first for the optimal timing, Tc, and 
structural density, Kc, in the second stage, taking the first-stage decisions Tr and Kr as given. The 
first-order conditions for the second-stage problem are: 
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Equation (2) implies the optimal scale of capital investment in the commercial structure 
at which the marginal cost of capital−which is simply the price of a unit of capital, p−equals the 
marginal benefit of capital which is the increase in rents associated with an additional increase in 
capital. Equation (3) shows that, at the optimal timing Tc, the marginal cost of delay−which is the 
rents forgone from making the new conversion of property to a commercial use−equals the 
marginal benefit of delay which is the rents that continue to accrue to the incumbent residential 
use of land plus the interest saved by delaying the new conversion additional period. 
The first-order conditions for the first-stage problem are obtained by differentiating the 
objective function (1) with respect to Kr and Tr, after substituting the second-stage solution, 
Tc(Tr,Kr) and Kc(Tr,Kr), into the objective function. Or, by the envelope theorem, 
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Table A.2 in the appendix C contains numerical solutions for equations (2)∼(5) for various 
parameter values. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the comparative statics. 
 
Table  4.1 Summary of comparative statics 
 i ηr ηc rr(0) rc(0) p d 
Tr + ? – – – + + 
Kr – + – + – – + 
Tc – + – + – + + 
Kc – + + + – – + 
 
Note: i = interest rate, η = growth rate of rent (ηr for residential use and ηc for commercial use of land), r(0) = rent 
at time zero (rr
                                                
(0) for residential use and rc(0) for commercial use of land), p = price of a unit of capital, d = 
replacement cost parameter. 
 
4.3 PROPERTY TAXATION AND TIF 
Now we introduce property taxation and tax increment financing. Let xs denote a property tax 
rate that applies to land and xk to structures. For a TIF subsidy, note that the sponsoring 
jurisdiction finances its share of the development cost by issuing bonds. Then it pays the bonds 
by dedicating the increment of tax revenue the property generates, relative to its predevelopment 
assessed value, to paying off these bond obligations. In effect, the private developer receives 
assets from the taxing authority. These assets are essentially “gifts,” the magnitude of which is 
proportional to the increment of the development cost.26 Therefore, the size of the TIF subsidy 
 
26 The legal ownership of public investments belongs to the local government. However, from an economic 
perspective the public investments, once made, have an effect of transferring assets to the developer, since they 
become inseparable from the private investments that are made in conjunction with the public investments. 
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becomes {wp(Kc−Kr)}, where w is a TIF subsidy rate that determines the portion of the 
development cost shared by the sponsoring jurisdiction. 
Then the objective function facing a private developer can be written as follows: 
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where P(T,K) denotes the discounted present value of land. R(T,K), the discounted 
present value of land, gross of land tax, is 
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The same procedure employed to solve the problem in the absence of property taxation 
and TIF yields the following first-order conditions for this problem: 
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Equations (8)∼(11) correspond to equations (2)∼(5), but incorporate the tax rate on 
structures, xk, and the effect of TIF, w, on the cost of capital for “commercial” development. 
Notice that the tax rate on land, xs, will not be taken into account for the first-order conditions 
and, therefore, has no effect on the investment decisions. In effect, this land tax is equivalent to a 
tax on the profit from the ‘highest and best’ use of the land so that the private developer cannot 
do better than choosing the same path of development as would choose in the absence of the land 
tax. By contrast, the tax rate on structures, xk, and TIF subsidy rate, w, do enter into the first-
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order conditions. Their effects on the sequence of property conversions to more intensive uses 
are summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
Table  4.2 Summary of comparative statics (property taxation and TIF) 
 xs xk w 
Tr 0 + – 
Kr 0 – – 
Tc 0 + – 
Kc 0 – + 
  
Note: xs = land tax rate; xk = structure tax rate; w = TIF subsidy rate 
 
The economic intuition for the comparative statics results with respect to a property tax 
and a TIF subsidy is straightforward. Notice that both the tax on structures and the TIF subsidy 
work in the similar way as the price of capital works for the first-order conditions. However, 
unlike a reduction in property tax, which increases capital investment in both development 
phases, an increase in TIF increases capital investment in the “commercial,” TIF qualifying 
phase, but decreases capital investment in the “residential,” non-qualifying phase. The reason 
for its negative effect on the “residential” investment phase is straightforward. The residential 
capital serves as the base on which the tax is levied during the interval in which “commercial” 
capital is subject to TIF. The smaller this base, the larger the effective subsidy created by the 
TIF. Therefore, TIF induces a land developer to sacrifice some value from “residential” use 
during the “residential” phase in order to secure a larger effective subsidy per dollar invested in 
the “commercial” phase. 
Thus, TIF is not equivalent to a reduction in the property tax on structures. It reduces the 
distortionary effect of property taxes in the “commercial,” TIF qualifying phase, but increases 
the distortionary effect of property taxation in the non-qualifying phase.  Therefore, the net effect 
of a TIF on our welfare measure−denoted total surplus and measured by the sum of the 
discounted present values of land and net tax revenue−depends on the magnitude of the TIF 
subsidy, w. This is reflected in the numerical results displayed in Table A3 in the appendix. The 
largest welfare is achieved when there are neither taxes nor subsidies on structures. As that table 
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shows, when there is a tax on structures, total surplus first increases and then decreases as the 
TIF subsidy increases. Interestingly, the net of tax value of land, secured by the landowner, will 
increase as TIF increases, even as the discounted present value of taxes (total surplus − land 
value) decreases. Therefore, TIFs are always good for landowners, even when they are 
disadvantageous for tax payers as a group. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we focused on the way in which TIF interacts with property taxation to affect the 
intensity and timing of capital investments. Unlike prior studies, which only analyze the effect of 
TIF on the intensity of investments that qualify for tax increment financing, we also consider the 
effect of TIF on earlier non-qualifying investments. We do so because TIF is now a regular 
feature of local fiscal policy. Therefore, private developers may anticipate the opportunity to 
secure a TIF at a later point in time, when making investment decisions that do not currently 
qualify for a TIF subsidy. This anticipated behavior of private developers affects the entire path 
of land development. 
Our analysis highlights the importance of the way by which the incremental tax revenue 
is computed. The “residential” capital, that does not qualify for TIF, serves as the base from 
which the TIF subsidy is computed. This creates incentives for the developer to invest on a lower 
scale in the earlier non-qualifying phase in order to secure a larger effective subsidy per dollar 
invested in the TIF qualifying phase. As a result, TIF reduces the distortionary effect of property 
taxes in the “commercial,” TIF qualifying phase, but increases the distortionary effect of 
property taxation in the non-qualifying phase. The net effect of a TIF on total surplus−the sum of 
the discounted present values of land and net tax revenue−depends on the magnitude of the TIF 
subsidy. In the presence of a property tax on structures, total surplus first increases and then 
decreases as the TIF subsidy increases. Our results also show that TIFs are always beneficial for 
landowners, even when they are disadvantageous for tax payers as a group. 
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Table  A.1: Table of Equilibria 
 
 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7 n = 8 n = 9 
Atomistic Eqm         
         
d (defense) 0.40845 0.40845 0.40845 0.40845 0.40845 0.40845 0.40845 0.40845 
         
p 
(predator/producer) 0.83095 0.83095 0.83095 0.83095 0.83095 0.83095 0.83095 0.83095 
         
C (consumption) 0.01508 0.01541 0.01356 0.01181 0.01038 0.00923 0.00829 0.00752 
         
Boundedly Rational 
Community Eqm 
                
         
d (defense) 0.10593 0.09983 0.09167 0.08466 0.07885 0.07400 0.06991 0.06640 
           
p 
(predator/producer) 0.13340 0.12476 0.11341 0.10383 0.09602 0.08959 0.08421 0.07965 
           
C (consumption) 0.00099 0.03502 0.04020 0.03949 0.03731 0.03487 0.03251 0.03036 
         
Fully Rational 
Community Eqm** 
        
        
d (defense) 0.30809 0.00865 0.00000 0.00000* 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
         
p 
(predator/producer) 0.52050 0.00971 0.00000 0.00000* 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
         
C (consumption) 0.01723 0.03691 0.04850 0.04880* 0.04622 0.04302 0.03988 0.03699 
 
NOTE. * Global equilibrium when n is selectable. ** Fully rational community equilibrium is the same as the global 
equilibrium when a central government planner takes n as fixed. 
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APPENDIX B 
Expected Consumption in the Atomistic Equilibrium and Boundedly Rational Community 
Equilibrium in (n,k) parameter space, given t = 0.9 
 
 
 
Figure  A.1: Atomistic equilibrium C(n,k) (bottom with large n) and boundedly rational community 
equilibrium C(n,k) (top with large n), given t = 0.9 
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APPENDIX C 
Table  A.2: Numerical Solutions 
 Tr Kr Tc Kc 
Land 
Value  
      
i = 0.08 0.35 4.70 46.86 73.71 0.41232 
i = 0.10 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
i = 0.12 9.78 3.63 39.71 19.13 0.03235 
      
ηr = 0.028 5.21 3.39 35.99 22.52 0.08764 
ηr = 0.035 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
ηr = 0.042 5.74 4.78 47.44 42.26 0.12660 
      
ηc = 0.048 5.69 4.21 48.57 27.71 0.07739 
ηc = 0.055 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
ηc = 0.062 4.80 3.76 36.46 35.32 0.15652 
      
rr(0) = 0.009 12.09 3.18 35.00 21.32 0.09279 
rr(0) = 0.012 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
rr(0) = 0.014 1.24 4.19 43.22 33.51 0.13607 
      
rc(0) = 0.004 6.07 4.39 57.04 40.96 0.07604 
rc(0) = 0.007 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
rc(0) = 0.010 4.16 3.38 29.75 22.82 0.14896 
      
p = 0.042 0.39 4.05 38.43 30.65 0.13270 
p = 0.050 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
p = 0.058 9.18 3.83 42.19 27.30 0.08461 
      
d = 0.05 5.14 3.94 39.47 27.26 0.10449 
d = 0.30 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 
d = 0.60 5.15 3.95 41.54 30.55 0.10260 
  
i = interest rate, η = growth rate of rent (ηr for residential use and ηc for commercial use of land), r(0) = rent at time 
zero (rr(0) for residential use and rc(0) for commercial use of land), p = price of a unit of capital, d = replacement 
cost parameter. 
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 When each of the parameters is varied for comparative statics, the other parameters are set as follows: i = 0.1, ηr = 
0.035, ηc = 0.055, rr(0) = 0.012, rc(0) = 0.007, p = 0.05, d = 0.3. The range of parameter values is selected with the 
consideration of interior solutions. For the output of housing/office space, the natural logarithmic function is used, 
Q(K) = lnK, which satisfies the conditions for Q′(K) > 0 and Q″(K) < 0. The sufficient condition for a local 
maximum is a decreasing output elasticity of capital. With Q(K) = lnK, the output elasticity is Q′(K)K/Q(K) = 1/lnK. 
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APPENDIX D 
Table  A.3: Numerical  Solutions with Property Taxation and TIF 
xs = land tax rate; xk = structure tax rate; w = TIF subsidy rate. Other parameter values are set as follows: i = 0.1, ηr 
= 0.035, ηc = 0.055, rr(0) = 0.012, rc(0) = 0.007, p = 0.05, d = 0.3. 
*Net tax revenue is computed as the sum of the discounted present values of tax on land and structures less TIF 
subsidy.**Total surplus is measured by the sum of the discounted present values of land and net tax revenue. 
 Tr Kr Tc Kc 
Land  
Value 
Net Tax  
Revenue* 
Total 
Surplus** 
    
xs = 0.00,  xk = 0.00,  w = 0.00 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.10358 0 0.10358 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.00,  w = 0.00 5.15 3.94 40.46 28.80 0.07968 0.02390 0.10358 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.00,  w = 0.10 5.03 3.88 39.39 30.16 0.08149 0.02189 0.10338 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.00,  w = 0.20 4.89 3.81 38.17 31.74 0.08365 0.01895 0.10260 
    
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.02,  w = 0.00 10.09 3.81 41.68 25.66 0.06278 0.03609 0.09886 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.02,  w = 0.10 9.98 3.74 40.75 26.60 0.06417 0.03500 0.09916 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.02,  w = 0.20 9.85 3.67 39.71 27.63 0.06578 0.03345 0.09923 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.02,  w = 0.30 9.70 3.59 38.53 28.78 0.06767 0.03124 0.09891 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.02,  w = 0.40 9.54 3.49 37.17 30.04 0.06993 0.02798 0.09790 
    
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.03,  w = 0.00 12.26 3.74 42.21 24.39 0.05679 0.03805 0.09485 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.03,  w = 0.10 12.15 3.68 41.33 25.18 0.05804 0.03724 0.09527 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.03,  w = 0.20 12.02 3.61 40.36 26.04 0.05946 0.03609 0.09554 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.03,  w = 0.30 11.88 3.53 39.26 26.96 0.06110 0.03445 0.09556 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.03,  w = 0.40 11.73 3.43 38.02 27.97 0.06304 0.03210 0.09514 
xs = 0.03,  xk = 0.03,  w = 0.50 11.55 3.31 36.57 29.06 0.06536 0.02862 0.09398 
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